Visiting speaker seminar series, Semester 1, 2023-24

UPDATE! Amelia Bonea’s talk on 13 December will now be hybrid, starting at 3.45 — but mince pies and mulled wine will be available in BH1.03 from 3pm! See below for further information.

All seminars are (normally) on Wednesdays, 3.15pm-5pm. Some are in-person — these are all in Botany House room 1.03 unless otherwise stated. (There is a campus map here.) Others are on Zoom; a link will appear next to the seminar listing below at least a day or so in advance. (No hybrid seminars at the moment, sorry. We will revisit this if and when we get better camera/microphone kit!) All welcome!

4 OCTOBER (in person): Jim Secord (History & Philosophy of Science, Cambridge)

NOTE VENUE: BAINES WING 1.16

Also we have had to postpone the launch of Greg Radick’s book, which was supposed to follow the seminar, due to a train strike. We’ll announce it on this site when we’ve rescheduled it.

Against Revolutions. The public image of the history of science remains dominated by dramatic revolutions. Revolutionary narratives also continue to structure–either explicitly or implicitly–much academic teaching and research. This paper examines how the framework of scientific revolutions gained widespread circulation among historians and philosophers in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and what functions it has served. The so-called Darwinian Revolution, for example, is a residual inheritance of the otherwise rejected notion of a ‘warfare’ between religion and science. The economic and military implications of geology were for many years displaced by a singular focus on the Plate Tectonics Revolution. Such narratives locate epistemic violence within specialist communities, obscuring the role of the sciences in colonial conquest and in silencing other ways of knowing. Current efforts to reestablish historical studies of science on a new basis need to tackle the problem of displaced epistemic violence more directly. More fundamentally, the emerging focus on global exchange and conflict needs to encompass much earlier periods, countering the tendency to see only recent science as relevant to the present.

18 OCTOBER (Zoom): Kirsten Walsh (Sociology, Philosophy & Anthropology, Exeter)

Join here. Meeting ID: 861 1187 4377 / password Hps2324!

Situated cognition in early modern experimentation: the case of compelled assent. The early moderns surely didn’t have an embodied, extended, embedded or enacted conception of the mind, but I aim to show that this perspective can make sense of some of their practices: in particular, how experimental philosophers approached their experiments. Focusing on Newton’s optical experiments, I’ll argue that some aspects of early modern scientific practice turn crucially on how the experimenter is situated towards gaining particular kinds of know-how. My account provides one answer to a long-standing puzzle regarding Newton’s method: namely, his appeal to ‘compelled assent’ as an epistemic standard.

1 NOVEMBER (in person): Al Wilson (HPS, Leeds)

Four grades of modal naturalism. A-prioristic modal metaphysics aims to identify a space of possibilities that is independent of, and epistemically prior to, the discoveries of natural science. Naturalistic modal metaphysics, by contrast, aims to bring scientific evidence to bear on modal questions directly. The greater the evidential role given to science by an approach to modality, the more naturalistic is that approach. In this talk I distinguish four increasingly naturalistic approaches to objective modality, and discuss how to locate some familiar theoretical discoveries from the history of natural science within the resulting framework.

This will be followed by an informal launch of Greg Radick’s new book, Disputed Inheritance, in the foyer of the Michael Sadler Building (up the stairs inside the main door and turn left), with drinks and nibbles — all welcome!

15 NOVEMBER (Zoom only: CLICK THIS LINK): Emily Collins (Computer Science, Manchester).

Relationships Mediating Trustworthy Human-Robot/AI Interaction: The Impact of Responsibility. Responsible Robotic and AI (RAI) use, should consider, and perhaps even place as central, the humans using these technologies, and what they transparently understand are the consequences of such use in the short/long-term, asking: Who is responsible for the use of these technologies and what does their usage result in? 

To understand any of this in the broadest sense, an understanding of the dynamics between the human users is essential. Who are the users? Who are the employers of those users? Who deploys the technology? And what do these mediating relationships, and – crucially – the trust between those branches, have to do with who is ultimately responsible for what happens when we use technology in real-world applied settings? 

After a brief discussion of the increasing interest in considering, measuring, and implementing trust in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), and relatedly Human-AI Interaction, as it pertains to responsibility, I will propose that the dyadic model of HRI misses a key complexity which lies at the core of both trustworthy RAI systems, and thus how to approach responsible RAI use: A robot’s trustworthiness may be contingent on the user’s relationship with, and opinion of, the individual or organisation deploying the robot. 

I will discuss examples highlighting the need for trustworthy RAI in a variety of disparate environments. This will demonstrate that there is no one approach to the answer of trustworthy RAI, because a human’s relationship with the person, employer, government, etc., who has given them RAI to work with is not consistent. Consequently, we should ask: Who is responsible when technology fails? The employer? The deployer? The user, instructed to work with the technology by said deployer? And ultimately, how does this affect how we understand who is responsible for the outcomes of Human-Robot/AI use? And what does a lack of answers here mean when it comes to building and deploying trustworthy RAI systems? 

29 NOVEMBER (in person): Katie Creel (Philosophy & Computer Science, Northeastern).

Don’t Use Machine Learning To Evaluate Grants (Kathleen Creel & Liam Kofi Bright)

Funding science is a chancy business.  Promising projects come to naught; strong results fail to replicate.  To reduce the uncertainty of their bets, grant-making agencies are encouraging the development of tools that aim to predict which papers will replicate — and, eventually, it is hoped, which grants to fund.  The putative benefits of a tool that could predict the success of funding proposals are clear: time saved, public funds better allocated. And the challenges to constructing such a tool seem equally clear: agreeing on machine-evaluable metrics of success for proposals, predicting future scientific success based on the past successes the future is mean to exceed.  The current state of automated prediction reflects these challenges.  But whether achievement of this task is likely in the short term — or even possible — is immaterial for our argument, which concerns the impact on the epistemic diversity of scientific communities impacted by the establishment of an automated bottleneck.

In this paper, we first outline the reasons to think machine learning-based predictive instruments are likely to homogenize which science is funded.  We then rehearse the arguments for epistemic diversity in science, establishing the stakes.  We next generate four possible scenarios for the deployment of algorithmic decision-making tools in grant evaluation by varying the predictive success of the average tool and the degree of correlation between the tools.  We show that no matter how predictively successful the tool is,  using machine learning to filter grants is likely to reduce the diversity of scientific approaches. We conclude by recommending solutions to grant-making agencies.

13 DECEMBER (hybrid): Amelia Bonea (CHISTM, Manchester). 3.45-5.30pm

Amelia will be presenting on Zoom — note the later start time. You can zoom in yourself, or else be more sociable and come along to BH1.03 to watch with others. Mince pies and mulled wine will be available from 3pm (same venue).

Zoom link / Passcode: x&Vj1@

Blank Pages of Geologic History’: Sciences, Politics and Economies of Deep Time in Twentieth-Century India. Among the many research committees set up in the 1940s by the newly established Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of the Government of India was one whose object of investigation focused on the measurement of geological time. Chaired by geologist D. N. Wadia, well known for his research on the stratigraphy and tectonics of the Himalayas and for acting as a Geological Adviser to the Government of India, the Committee counted among its members other notable scientists such as the chemist J. C. Ghosh, palaeobotanist B. Sahni and astrophysicist M. N. Saha. The immediate objective of the research group appeared to be to promote the radioactive dating of geological rocks in the Indian subcontinent, a method hailed for its potential to supplement earlier techniques that relied on stratigraphic correlation and the examination of microfossils. In this respect, the roots of the initiative were firmly anchored in unanswered questions about the ‘blank geological patches’ of the Indian subcontinent, among them the Pir Panjal Range in Kahsmir, which Wadia had visited in 1924 together with Sahni and G. E. Pilgrim, Superintendent of the Geological Survey of India. But why was the measurement of geological time important at this particular historical juncture in pre-independence India? The paper will use the activity of the Committee and the scientific output of various historical actors connected to it to address this question and discuss the significance of time as a conceptual and methodological device in palaeosciences in twentieth-century India. Focusing on palaeobotany and palaeontology, it will illuminate how palaeoscientists filled time with meaning and sought to establish correlations between geological and historical time scales. Their knowledge making was informed not only by the desire to fill the ‘blank pages of geologic history,’ but also by the strategic need to argue the economic relevance of their discipline to the exploitation of natural resources in the Indian subcontinent or to advance related geopolitical agendas.

Call for EPSA fellows

The Leeds centre for History and Philosophy of Science is proud to join the list of institutions offering to host a fellow in the 2023 fellowship scheme of EPSA – the European Philosophy of Science Association.

These fellowships are designed to foster collaboration between philosophers of science working in Eastern Europe with their colleagues in Western Europe. This year the scheme’s usual focus on Junior scholars from Eastern Europe has been expanded, so that senior and mid-career researchers are also eligible if they have been adversely affected by the war in Ukraine, in accordance with EPSA’s published statement https://philsci.eu/news/12655704.

Leeds’ Centre for HPS will host a fellow for up to one month, and contribute up to 1500 euros towards travel, accommodation and living expenses. During that time, the successful candidate will be a member of the centre and will be invited to participate in all our research activities. We are soliciting applications for fellowships in the areas of: Philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, metaphysics of science, explanation, causality, evolution, natural kinds, mechanisms, conservation metaphysics, cultural evolution, biological individuality or metaphysics of race.

Applicants should send a cv, covering letter explaining their motivation, research propoosal, and statement explaining why Leeds is a good fit, to epsa.fellowships@hpsleeds by April 17th.

For further details please see the EPSA website fellowships page https://philsci.eu/fellowships or write to Ellen Clarke at e.clarke@leeds.ac.uk

Visiting speaker seminar series: Semester 2, 2022-23

Schedule updated 4 March 2023.

UPDATE, 2 MAY 2023: Our final two seminars (Wed 3 and Tues 16 May, both in person) are both going ahead! Last-minute cancellations are always possible, however, so if you aren’t a member of HPS staff or on one of our mailing lists, please check back on the day just in case. Any queries, please contact the Centre Director, Helen Beebee.

All seminars are (normally) on Wednesdays, 3.15pm-5pm; some are in-person and some are on Zoom (none are hybrid). There is a campus map here. All welcome!

8 FEBRUARY (IN PERSON, Botany House 1.03)

Adrian Currie (Exeter): Fossils, Possibility and Robots

Abstract: (at least sometimes) Paleontology is a science of possibility, not history. Spinosaurus aegyptiacus isputatively the largest therapod dinosaur and—extremely speculatively—an aquatic pursuit predator. In developing such hypotheses, paleontologists situate particular species in a wide variety of what I’ll call ‘profiles’: multi-dimensional comparison classes, constructed via phylogenetics, comparative methods, morphological analysis, and even morphological robotics. Drawing on this case, I’ll highlight how paleontological knowledge explores biologically relevant areas of possibility, developing various ‘profiles’, secondarily knitting these together towards reconstructing the actual past. These explorations of possibility, in contrast with much modelling work in biology, are grounded in intimate, iterative conversation with fossils and other specimens. This grounding helps ensure that biological relevant areas of possibility are explored in a productive direction.

22 FEBRUARY: No seminar! Postponed to 3 May

8 MARCH (On zoom, via this link)

Anya Plutynski (Washington University in St. Louis): Towards a Multidimensional Model of Positive Mental Health

Shortly after the anniversary of the violent uprising of 2020 in the U.S., many have raised questions about what could explain these behaviors at the Capitol, including: Is this part of a pattern? If so, can we predict future violence? What underlies the extent of hatred and division that plagues the U.S. today? What underlying psychological mechanisms could drive this behavior? Has the U.S. become a nation of “narcissists”, or, people who are undeservedly entitled, unreasonably paranoid, prone to violence, easily destabilized or threatened? 

This talk is inspired by just these questions. Most work in philosophy of psychiatry has focused on defining and classifying mental illness. However, there is a growing body of work on mental health (Wren-Lewis and Alexandrova, 2021; Murphy, et. al., 2020). One question at the center of this emerging literature is whether there is such a thing as “positive” mental health, over and above mere absence of mental illness. In this paper, I argue that the more contested subcategories of the DSM may shed light on exactly this issue. Personality disorders are not easily characterized as biological dysfunction, but neither (arguably) are those diagnosed with such disorders “mentally healthy.” The personality disorders appear at best to be an unstable kind, but nonetheless a “kind-like” constellation of cognitive and emotional dispositions, motivations, and behaviors, whose weak associations can help shed light on larger questions about the nature of mental health. I use NPD as a case study to develop a multidimensional model of positive mental health.

15 MARCH (This will be on Zoom, on this link)

Michael Bycroft (Warwick): Why Matters Matter in the History and Philosophy of Science

Abstract: We can agree that matter matters for the history and philosophy of science. But do matters matter? Is there something to be gained by exploring the idea that different parts of the material world shape science in different ways? I shall argue that we have a great deal to learn—about the dynamics of experimental research, about the long-term development of science, about the links between science and society, and about the field of HPS itself. I shall illustrate these points with examples drawn from the natural sciences in the European Enlightenment.

22 MARCH (ZOOM, on this link)

Silvia De Cesare (Geneva): Organic progress and evolutionary theory

“Evolutionary biologists, it seems, can neither live with nor live without the idea of progress”: the historian of science John C. Greene thus sums up the complex question of the relationships between progress and evolutionary theory (Greene 1990). Applied to the organic domain, the idea of progress refers to a “change towards the better” in the history of living beings. Ever since Darwin, this notion is related to the mechanism of natural selection conceived as a cause of organic improvement, following the reasoning that organisms having a competitive advantage in the struggle for life should be somehow “better”. 

But is it possible to define a notion of organic progress that would be consistent with evolutionary theory? Despite the widespread view that the concept of organic progress is illegitimate within evolutionary theory (Desmond 2021), such an issue continues to raise questions in the contemporary debate (Nitecki 1988, Rosenberg and McShea 2008, De Cesare 2019, Desmond 2021). In fact, there seem to be two contrasting and coexisting intuitions in this debate: the intuition against organic progress, championed by S. J. Gould, and the intuition for organic progress, which follows Darwin’s reasoning about competitive advantage. 

In this presentation, I shall first clarify the two intuitions. I will then propose an explanation accounting for the persistence of the two intuitions and relating to temporal scales (local vs. global scale). I will claim that, although there are good arguments for the intuition against organic progress at a global scale, there is a theoretical need to justify the intuition for organic progress at short temporal scales. I will thus present the notion of “local improvement of organic traits” (referring to the concept of “adaptation”) as a viable notion of organic progress at a local scale.  However, I will also consider the problems that this notion raises. Finally, I shall make some remarks about possible candidates for organic progress at a global scale.

3 MAY (IN PERSON, Baines Wing 1.16)

Alexander von Lünen (Huddersfield): ‘The fraternity of brains?’: The Leeds Academic Assistance Committee 1933-39

Abstract: In the drive to Nazify the public sector, one of the earliest legislative measures in the “Third Reich” was the Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service from 7 April 1933. Its intent was to remove “non-Aryan” and politically non-compliant civil servants from their posts. While this did not affect the administration too much – the civil service in Weimar Germany was already rather conservative and right-wing and thus not very welcoming to Jewish Germans or socialists — it had a major impact on academia. German universities are public, and thus professors have civil servant status. Jewish and left-wing academics consequently lost their jobs and were among the first wave of refugees leaving Nazi Germany.

Given the good international networks in academia – established through international conferences, scientific societies etc – these academic refugees experienced a good degree of solidarity from their international colleagues, including British academics. In the summer of 1933, the Academic Assistance Council (AAC, renamed to Society for Protection of Science and Learning, SPSL, in 1936) was set up in London to help the German academics who had been dismissed from their posts find new employment internationally. In Leeds, professors from the University of Leeds set up the Leeds Academic Assistance Committee (LAAC) in June 1933, which operated independently from the national AAC/SPSL until early 1939. Its mission was to create and fund three fellowships at the university so that German academics would qualify for visas to come to Leeds for a limited amount of time, and find employment elsewhere eventually.This talk will give a history of the LAAC, its main actors, the struggles it had to face (it relied entirely on donations from the public, which often were not coming), and the fates of the three German scientists who came to Leeds in 1933/34. The talk will also give some insight into scientific networks, group identity among scientists, and solidarity among academics.

TUESDAY 16 MAY (IN PERSON, 17 Blenheim Terrace (IDEA Centre), Seminar Room 1)

Harjit Bhogal (University of Maryland): Does anything explain the regularity of the world?

Abstract: What explains why the world is regular, rather than chaotic? Metaphysical views that deny necessary connections between distinct existences — ‘Humean’ views — seem to imply that the answer is: Nothing. This looks like a major problem for those views. But, I claim, if we investigate the Humean conception of explanation we find reason to think that the most general regularities are appropriately unexplained.